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1023 
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY: PROTECTING 
“ALL BUT THE PLAINLY INCOMPETENT” 
(AND MAYBE SOME OF THEM, TOO) 
SUSAN BENDLIN* 
Qualified immunity “gives government officials breathing room to 
make reasonable but mistaken judgments,” and “protects all but the 
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Public officials can be more certain than ever before that 
qualified immunity will shield them from suits for money damages 
even if their actions violate the constitutional rights of another. In 
the October 2011 term, the Supreme Court of the United States 
granted qualified immunity to government officials in four 
significant cases and denied it to none.2 In all four cases, the Court 
overturned an appellate court’s denial of qualified immunity,3 
thereby signaling a broad and generous application of the 
protective doctrine to those “who carr[y] out the work of the 
government.”4 Additionally, the Supreme Court denied petitions 
for writs of certiorari in thirty-seven other cases involving 
qualified immunity,5 letting stand twenty-eight instances where 
 
* The author, an Assistant Professor at Barry University School of Law, has 
served as Dean of Students at three law schools: Emory, Duke, and Barry. She 
wishes to thank her research assistants, Rihana Quashie (JD Candidate, 
2014) and Amy German (JD Candidate, 2013). 
 1.  Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1244-45 (2012) (quoting 
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2085 (2011)). 
 2.  Filarsky v. Delia, 132 S. Ct. 1657, 1668 (2012); Messerschmidt, 132 S. 
Ct. at 1250-51; Ryburn v. Huff, 132 S. Ct. 987, 990-92 (2012) (per curiam); 
Reichle v. Howards, 132 S. Ct. 2088, 2093 (2012). 
 3.  Filarsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1668; Messerschmidt, 132 S. Ct. at 1250-51; 
Ryburn, 132 S. Ct. at 990-92; Reichle, 132 S. Ct. at 2093. 
 4.  Filarsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1665 (referring to the shield of qualified 
immunity protecting “those who carr[y] out the work of the government”). 
 5.  Sharp v. Johnson, No. 11-1357, 2012 WL 1657210 (U.S. June 25, 2012) 
(mem.), denying cert. to 669 F.3d 144 (3d Cir. 2012); Suffolk Cnty., N.Y. v. 
Field Day, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 2749 (2012) (mem.), denying cert. to 463 F.3d 167 
(2d Cir. 2006); Morgan v. Swanson, 132 S. Ct. 2740 (2012) (mem.), denying 
cert. to 659 F.3d 359 (5th Cir. 2011); Swanson v. Morgan, 132 S. Ct. 2740 
(2012) (mem.), denying cert. to 659 F.3d 359 (5th Cir. 2011); Estate of Henson 
v. Krajca, 132 S. Ct. 2742 (2012) (mem.), denying cert. to 440 Fed. Appx. 341 
(5th Cir. 2011); Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 132 S. Ct. 2751 (2012) (mem.), denying 
cert. to 670 F.3d 540 (4th Cir. 2012); Rockwell v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 2433 (2012) 
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the appellate courts granted qualified immunity.6 In only ten cases 
did the Court leave undisturbed a denial of qualified immunity.7 
 
(mem.), denying cert. to 664 F.3d 985 (5th Cir. 2011); Daman v. Brooks, 132 S. 
Ct. 2681 (2012) (mem.), denying cert. to 661 F.3d 433 (9th Cir. 2011); Agarano 
v. Mattos, 132 S. Ct. 2682 (2012) (mem.), denying cert. to 661 F.3d 433 (9th 
Cir. 2011); Brooks v. Daman, 132 S. Ct. 2682 (2012) (mem.), denying cert. to 
661 F.3d 433 (9th Cir. 2011); Mattos v. Agarano, 132 S. Ct. 2684 (2012) 
(mem.), denying cert. to 661 F.3d 433 (9th Cir. 2011); Lafond v. Ammons, 132 
S. Ct. 2379 (2012) (mem.), denying cert. to 648 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2011); 
Cilman v. Reeves, 132 S. Ct. 2385 (2012) (mem.), denying cert. to 452 Fed. 
Appx. 263 (4th Cir. 2011); Rodriguez v. City of Cleveland, Ohio, 132 S. Ct. 
2380 (2012) (mem.), denying cert. to 439 Fed. Appx. 433 (6th Cir. 2011); 
Gardner v. Chism, 132 S. Ct. 1916 (2012) (mem.), denying cert. to 661 F.3d 380 
(9th Cir. 2011); Moore v. Perkins, 132 S. Ct. 1861 (2012) (mem.), denying cert. 
to 450 Fed. Appx. 341 (5th Cir. 2011); Loudermilk v. Danner, 132 S. Ct. 1797 
(2012) (mem.), denying cert. to 449 Fed. Appx. 693 (9th Cir. 2011); Moore v. 
Guerrero, 132 S. Ct. 1793 (2012) (mem.), denying cert. to 442 Fed. Appx. 57 
(4th Cir. 2011); Cnty. of L.A., Cal. v. Ass’n for L.A. Deputy Sheriffs, 132 S. Ct. 
1797 (2012) (mem.), denying cert. to 648 F.3d 986 (9th Cir. 2011); Johnson v. 
Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 132 S. Ct. 1807 (2012) (mem.), denying cert. to 658 
F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2011); N. Las Vegas Police Dept. v. Conatser, 132 S. Ct. 
1740 (2012) (mem.), denying cert. to 445 Fed. Appx. 932 (9th Cir. 2011); Makas 
v. Miraglia, 132 S. Ct. 1769 (2012) (mem.), denying cert. to 435 Fed. Appx. 51 
(2d Cir. 2011); Norris v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 132 S. Ct. 1742 (2012) (mem.), 
denying cert. to 2011 WL 1793278 (Cal. Ct. App. May 11, 2011); Signature 
Pharm., Inc. v. Wright, 132 S. Ct. 1714 (2012) (mem.), denying cert. to 438 Fed. 
Appx. 741 (11th Cir. 2011); Coscia v. Town of Pembroke, Mass., 132 S. Ct. 
1558 (2012) (mem.), denying cert. to 659 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 2011); Diana v. 
Oliphant, 132 S. Ct. 1557 (2012) (mem.), denying cert. to 441 Fed. Appx. 76 (3d 
Cir. 2011); Sandel v. Williams, 132 S. Ct. 1558 (2012) (mem.), denying cert. to 
433 Fed. Appx. 353 (6th Cir. 2011); Williams v. Sandel, 132 S. Ct. 1622 (2012) 
(mem.), denying cert. to 433 Fed. Appx. 353 (6th Cir. 2011); C.F. v. Corbett, 
132 S. Ct. 1566 (2012) (mem.), denying cert. to 654 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2011); 
Troyanos v. Coats, 132 S. Ct. 1560 (2012) (mem.), denying cert. to 372 Fed. 
Appx. 932 (11th Cir. 2010); Susko v. City of Weirton, W. Va., 132 S. Ct. 1145 
(2012) (mem.), denying cert. to 443 Fed. Appx. 805 (4th Cir. 2011); Alvis v. 
Espinosa, 132 S. Ct. 1089 (2012) (mem.), denying cert. to 598 F.3d 528 (9th 
Cir. 2010); Noriega v. Torres, 132 S. Ct. 1032 (2012) (mem.), denying cert. to 
648 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2011); Purnell v. Henry, 132 S. Ct. 781 (2011) (mem.), 
denying cert. to 652 F.3d 524 (4th Cir. 2011); Hayden v. Green, 132 S. Ct. 543 
(2011) (mem.), denying cert. to 640 F.3d 150 (6th Cir. 2011); Castle v. 
Thompson, 132 S. Ct. 251 (2011) (mem.), denying cert. to 631 F.3d 1194 (11th 
Cir. 2011); Lillo v. Bruhn, 132. S. Ct. 244 (2011) (mem.), denying cert. to 413 
Fed. Appx. 161 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 6.  Sharp, 2012 WL 1657210; Morgan, 132 S. Ct. 2740; Swanson, 132 S. 
Ct. 2740; Estate of Henson, 132 S. Ct. 2742; Lebron, 132 S Ct. 2751; Rockwell, 
132 S. Ct. 2433; Daman, 132 S. Ct. 2681; Agarano, 132 S. Ct. 2682; Brooks, 
132 S. Ct. 2682; Mattos, 132 S. Ct. 2684; Lafond, 132 S. Ct. 2379; Cilman, 132 
S. Ct. 2385; Rodriguez, 132 S. Ct. 2380; Moore, 132 S. Ct. 1861; Loudermilk, 
132 S. Ct. 1797; Cnty. of L.A., 132 S. Ct. 1797; Makas, 132 S. Ct. 1769; Norris, 
132 S. Ct. 1742; Signature Pharm., 132 S. Ct. 1714; Diana, 132 S. Ct. 1557; 
Sandel, 132 S. Ct. 1558; Williams, 132 S. Ct. 1622; Corbett, 132 S. Ct. 1566; 
Troyanos, 132 S. Ct. 1560; Susko, 132 S. Ct. 1145; Hayden, 132 S. Ct. 543; 
Castle, 132 S. Ct. 251; Lillo, 132. S. Ct. 244. 
 7.  Suffolk Cnty., N.Y., 132 S. Ct. 2749; Lafond, 132 S. Ct. 2379; Gardner, 
Do Not Delete 11/17/2012  9:14 PM 
2012] Qualified Immunity 1025 
There was a split in one case where the court of appeals granted 
qualified immunity to one defendant and denied it to the other.8 In 
that case, the defendants submitted a petition for certiorari, which 
the Supreme Court denied, letting stand the appellate court’s 
decision to grant qualified immunity to one defendant and siding 
with the denial of qualified immunity to the other defendant.9 
The doctrine of qualified immunity shields state officials from 
individual liability for violations of constitutional rights if the test 
for immunity is met.10 For many years, the test involved two 
inquiries: (1) whether the facts show that the actions of the public 
official violated a constitutional right, and (2) whether that right 
was clearly established at the time of the official’s alleged 
misconduct.11 In 2009, the Supreme Court held that courts may 
address these two questions in either order ending an eight-year 
period during which it was mandatory to analyze the two inquiries 
in sequential order.12 As a result, many courts (including the 
Supreme Court) are now avoiding the first question entirely.13 
The Supreme Court’s position is that government officials 
should be able to count on the protection afforded by qualified 
immunity.14 Chief Justice John Roberts recently wrote that “[a]n 
uncertain immunity is little better than no immunity at all.”15 
There are two ways of attaining more certainty. One is for the 
Supreme Court to issue opinions that address and clarify the law 
on confusing constitutional questions.16 If the law were clearer, 
state officials would have better guidance about what they can 
legally do and they would be less likely to violate rights in the 
process. Another is by simply granting qualified immunity in every 
case except the most egregious instances of incompetent conduct 
 
132 S. Ct. 1916; Moore, 132 S. Ct. 1793; Johnson, 132 S. Ct. 1807; N. Las 
Vegas Police Dept., 132 S. Ct. 1740; Coscia, 32 S. Ct. 1558; Alvis, 132 S. Ct. 
1089; Noriega, 132 S. Ct. 1032; Purnell, 132 S. Ct. 781. 
 8.  Lafond, 132 S. Ct. 2379. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (holding that 
“government officials performing discretionary functions generally are 
shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not 
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 
reasonable person would have known”). 
 11.  Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). 
 12.  Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). 
 13.  See infra note 45 and accompanying text.  
 14.  See Filarsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1665-66 (demonstrating the importance of 
qualified immunity). 
 15.  Id. at 1666. 
 16.  An example would be whether the Tinker test allowing public schools 
to regulate students’ on-campus speech should apply to off-campus Internet 
speech that disrupts the campus. See generally Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. 
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (applying interference test to determine 
whether in-school speech was constitutionally protected). 
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by state officials. The latter approach is the one currently taken by 
the Supreme Court. 
“Qualified immunity ‘gives government officials breathing 
room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments,’ and ‘protects 
all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the 
law.’”17 This Article does not contend that any specific state 
officials are plainly incompetent, nor is it fair to say that qualified 
immunity was wrongly granted in any of the cases decided by the 
Supreme Court during this term. On the contrary, government 
workers should be shielded from individual liability when they 
perform their jobs reasonably and competently. The real concern, 
however, is that the test is evolving to the point where almost 
every governmental actor will be shielded from individual liability 
by the doctrine of qualified immunity. Troublesome aspects of the 
Supreme Court’s current approach include (1) the failure to clarify 
important constitutional questions, and (2) the blurring of the 
distinction between absolute and qualified immunity for all 
practical purposes by assuring state officials that they can be 
certain of the shield from liability. 
This Article focuses narrowly on the Supreme Court’s most 
recent qualified immunity decisions in which state officials are 
shielded from suit even without any determination as to whether 
their actions violated citizens’ constitutional rights. Part II of this 
Article discusses how the qualified immunity test has recently 
changed. Part III summarizes the newest Supreme Court decisions 
on qualified immunity. Part IV addresses some problematic 
aspects of the current approach. 
II. THE TWO-PRONGED TEST FOR QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AND HOW 
THE TEST HAS EVOLVED 
Most government officials—in their individual capacities—are 
immune from liability for money damages for their official 
actions.18 Some, based on the importance of their functions, are 
entitled to absolute immunity when they act within the scope of 
their authority.19 Examples include legislators, judges, 
“prosecutors in their role as advocates,” and “witnesses giving 
testimony at trial.”20 Other state officials whose functions are less 
vital are not protected by absolute immunity, but will be granted 
 
 17.  Messerschmidt, 132 S. Ct. at 1244-45 (quoting Ashcroft, 131 S. Ct. at 
2085). 
 18.  Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818; see also D.F. ex rel. Farnan v. Capistrano 
Unified Sch. Dist., 654 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding a teacher was 
protected by qualified immunity). 
 19.  See Rehberg v. Paulk, 132 S. Ct. 1497, 1503 (2012) (stating that the 
Court takes what has been termed a “functional approach” and citing 
Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224 (1988)). 
 20.  Id. (internal citations omitted). 
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qualified immunity to shield them from individual liability in 
certain situations.21 These include “the chief executive officer of a 
State,” “the senior and subordinate officers of a State’s National 
Guard,” “the president of a state university,” police officers, and 
public school officials.22 
A. The Two-Pronged Test for Qualified Immunity 
The test for qualified immunity as announced in Saucier v. 
Katz23 was (1) whether the state official’s actions violated a 
constitutional right, and (2) whether that right was clearly 
established at the time of the official’s alleged misconduct.24 In 
Saucier, the Supreme Court held that the first inquiry had to be 
addressed first.25 However, in 2009, the Court in Pearson v. 
Callahan26 abolished mandatory sequencing and held that courts 
may address the two prongs of the test in either order.27 
While acknowledging that a positive aspect of the Saucier 
protocol was that “the two-step procedure promotes the 
development of constitutional precedent,”28 the Supreme Court 
also stated that, on the negative side, it “sometimes results in a 
substantial expenditure of scarce judicial resources on difficult 
questions that have no effect on the outcome of the case.”29 The 
Pearson Court concluded that federal courts “should be permitted 
to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two 
prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed 
first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.”30 
To support its abandonment of the sequencing requirement, 
the Supreme Court in Pearson described several situations where 
skipping the first step of the qualified immunity analysis might be 
desirable.31 These situations include: (1) “cases in which it is plain 
that a constitutional right is not clearly established but far from 
obvious whether in fact there is such a right;”32 (2) cases where 
parties must endure “the costs of litigating constitutional 
 
 21.  See id. (listing examples of officials who will only be protected by 
qualified immunity in certain situations). 
 22.  Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 23.  Saucier, 533 U.S. 194. 
 24.  Id. at 200. 
 25.  Id. at 201. The “threshold” is, “[t]aken in the light most favorable to the 
party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct 
violated a constitutional right?” Id. If not, the inquiry ends. Id. If so, then “the 
next, sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly established.” Id. 
 26.  Pearson, 555 U.S. 223. 
 27.  Id. at 236. 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id. at 236-37. 
 30.  Id. at 236. 
 31.  Id. at 237-39. 
 32.  Id. at 237. 
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questions and delays attributable to resolving them—when the 
suit otherwise could be disposed of more readily;”33 (3) “cases in 
which the constitutional question is so factbound that the decision 
provides little guidance for future cases;”34 (4) cases where “it 
appears that the question will soon be decided by a higher court;”35 
(5) “cases in which resolution of the constitutional question 
requires clarification of an ambiguous state statute . . . or 
“‘depends on a federal court’s uncertain assumptions about state 
law;’”36 (6) cases where “qualified immunity is asserted at the 
pleading stage” and “the precise factual basis for the plaintiff’s 
claim or claims may be hard to identify;”37 and (7) cases where “the 
first step of the Saucier procedure may create a risk of bad 
decisionmaking,” such as when “the briefing of constitutional 
questions is woefully inadequate.”38 
An important concern was that “[a]dherence to Saucier’s two-
step protocol departs from the general rule of constitutional 
avoidance and runs counter to the ‘older, wiser judicial counsel not 
to pass on questions of constitutionality . . . unless such 
adjudication is unavoidable.’”39 One commentator criticized the 
“unnecessary [c]onstitutional rulings” resulting from Saucier’s 
sequencing requirement, but acknowledged that “[t]he most 
prominent justification for the Court’s approach is that it ensures 
the continued evolution of constitutional rights.”40 He added, 
“[a]lthough this is a powerful justification for unnecessary 
constitutional rulings, it overlooks an important consideration. 
When a court reaches out to decide the constitutional issue, it will 
not necessarily rule that the right exists.”41 
Even if the Supreme Court were to determine that no 
constitutional right existed in a given situation, that decision 
clarifies the law. Such clarity is beneficial, as was observed 
 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. at 238. 
 36.  Id. (quoting Egolf v. Witmer, 526 F.3d 104, 110 (3d Cir. 2008)). 
 37.  Id. at 238-39. 
 38.  Id. at 239. 
 39.  Id. at 241 (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 388 (2007) (Breyer, J., 
concurring)). 
 40.  Thomas Healy, The Rise of Unnecessary Constitutional Rulings, 83 
N.C. L. REV. 847, 857 (2005) (stating that “[b]y reaching constitutional issues 
even in cases where a non-constitutional issue is dispositive, courts are able to 
articulate new constitutional rights that will benefit later litigants. This is 
especially important in areas such as qualified immunity and habeas corpus, 
where relief can be granted only if the right has been clearly established”). Id. 
The author’s view, however, was that unnecessary constitutional decisions are 
unwarranted and do not demonstrably advance individual rights because the 
Supreme Court often rules against plaintiffs and finds that there was no 
constitutional right at issue. Id. 
 41.  Id. 
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eloquently in earlier Supreme Court opinions. For example, a 
decade earlier in Siegert v. Gilley,42 the Supreme Court made the 
seemingly inherently logical statement that “[a] necessary 
concomitant to the determination of whether the constitutional 
right asserted by a plaintiff is ‘clearly established’ at the time the 
defendant acted is the determination of whether the plaintiff has 
asserted a violation of a constitutional right at all.”43 This same 
point was reemphasized in 2001 when the Court stated that “[t]he 
law might be deprived of this explanation were a court simply to 
skip ahead to the question whether the law clearly established 
that the officer’s conduct was unlawful.”44 
After Pearson, many courts reserved the ability to jump 
straight into an analysis of the second inquiry,45 that is, whether 
the constitutional right in question was clearly established at the 
time of the official’s action. Although Pearson did not rule that 
courts could entirely disregard the first prong, that is what has 
occurred even at the Supreme Court level.46 
Because the qualified immunity test has been applied 
differently post-Pearson, the old two-pronged definition seems no 
longer relevant even though it has not been officially abandoned. 
The current test focuses on the second prong. There appear to be 
two aspects of the analysis as to whether the right was clearly 
established: (1) at the time of the action, was the law clearly 
established based on precedent from the Supreme Court or other 
binding authority? And (2) under the circumstances, would a 
reasonable, competent official have known that his actions were 
illegal?47 
B. A Previous Empirical Study of Qualified Immunity Decisions 
The above-mentioned emphasis on the second prong—
whether the right was clearly established—is not surprising when 
one examines the history of qualified immunity analysis. In an 
extensive empirical study of qualified immunity, Greg Sobolski 
and Matt Steinberg analyzed 741 appellate qualified immunity 
 
 42.  Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226 (1991). 
 43.  Id. at 232. 
 44.  Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201. 
 45.  See, e.g., Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080 (2011) (stating that 
“courts have discretion to decide which of the two prongs of qualified-
immunity analysis to tackle first”); Millender v. Cnty. of L.A., 620 F.3d 1016, 
1024 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc), rev’d on other grounds by Messerschmidt, 132 S. 
Ct. 1235. 
 46.  See, e.g., Reichle, 132 S. Ct. at 2093. 
 47.  Messerschmidt, 132 S. Ct. at 1245; see also Pearson, 555 U.S. at 239 
(emphasizing that “qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from 
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly 
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person 
would have known’” (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). 
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cases from 1976 to 2008.48 Only a few other empirical studies have 
been done, and those involved much smaller samples.49 One 
unsurprising consensus in the studies is that when courts address 
the two prongs in sequential order, there are fewer cases where 
the constitutional question is skipped.50 
The Sobolski-Steinberg study divided the qualified immunity 
jurisprudence into four time periods.51 Those time periods are 
marked by a shift in the Supreme Court’s approach to the two-
pronged test and whether it was mandatory to address the first 
prong (whether a constitutional violation occurred) before turning 
to the second prong (whether the constitutional right was clearly 
established at the time the action was taken).52 Sobolski and 
Steinberg referred to this approach as “sequencing.”53 
The four time frames are: (1) from Pierson v. Ray54 in 1967 to 
Siegert in 1991 (described as a period where courts were free to 
address the questions in either order without guidance from the 
Supreme Court);55 (2) from Siegert to Saucier in 2001 (described as 
a period of confusion among courts and scholars as to whether it 
was mandatory to address the constitutional right before 
 
 48.  Greg Sobolski & Matt Steinberg, Note, An Empirical Analysis of 
Section 1983 Qualified Immunity Actions and Implications of Pearson v. 
Callahan, 62 STAN. L. REV. 523, 525 (2010). 
 49.  See, e.g., Healy, supra note 40, at 857 (analyzing two years of case law); 
Nancy Leong, The Saucier Qualified Immunity Experiment: An Empirical 
Analysis, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 667, 670 (2009) (analyzing six years of case law); 
Paul W. Hughes, Not a Failed Experiment: Wilson-Saucier Sequencing and the 
Articulation of Constitutional Rights, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 401, 404 (2009) 
(analyzing case law from three general time periods). 
 50.  Sobolski & Steinberg, supra note 48, at 526 (citing Hughes, supra note 
49 and Leong, supra note 49). The empirical study also revealed that even 
though courts that followed the Saucier sequencing found more claims of 
constitutional violations, the percentage of plaintiffs who ultimately recovered 
damages decreased after Saucier. Id. at 527. Courts more frequently answered 
“yes” to the question of whether a constitutional violation occurred but more 
often said “no” as to whether that right was clearly established at the time of 
the action. Id. at 549 (stating that “[p]re-Saucier, 83% (114 of 136) of rights-
affirming holding were followed by denials of qualified immunity . . . [but] 
[p]ost-Saucier, 72% of (123 of 170) of rights-affirming holdings were attached 
to denials of qualified immunity”). There was, however, an increase from 17% 
to 28% in grants of qualified immunity in the same time periods, showing a 
statistically significant increase in granting protection from suit to 
government officials. Id. 
 51.  Id. at 528; see also Hughes, supra note 49, at 404 (dividing the cases 
into only three time periods: “(1) the period prior to the Supreme Court’s 
development of the sequencing doctrine, (2) the period when sequencing was 
advisable but not considered mandatory, and (3) the [then-]present, post-
Wilson-Saucier period where sequencing is mandatory”). 
 52.  Sobolski & Steinberg, supra note 48, at 528. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967). 
 55.  Sobolski & Steinberg, supra note 48, at 530. 
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analyzing whether it was clearly established at the time);56 (3) 
from Saucier to Pearson in 2009 (described as a period of explicitly 
mandated sequencing);57 and (4) Post-Pearson (described as a 
period where sequencing is discretionary but encouraged).58 This 
Article does not re-address the shift that occurred in each time 
period. The purpose of mentioning the four periods is to 
acknowledge the significant swings in the Supreme Court’s past 
qualified immunity analysis. 
Referring to the first prong of the test as “the constitutional 
question,” Sobolski and Steinberg observed that more courts 
declined to analyze the first prong during time periods when the 
Supreme Court had not clearly mandated that the two questions 
be addressed in sequence.59 Although one study indicated that pre-
Saucier, courts were free to exercise discretion,60 the Sobolski-
Steinberg empirical study determined that some appellate courts 
already regarded sequencing as mandatory even before the 
Saucier Court’s pronouncement.61 Pearson ended all speculation by 
unequivocally allowing courts to exercise discretion in 
sequencing.62 
One of the study’s observations about past cases is equally 
true now in light of the Supreme Court’s most recent decisions: 
that there is less clarification of constitutional rights when courts 
are free to skip the first prong in the qualified immunity test.63 
The study’s authors indicated that the post-Pearson era would be 
an ideal time to study the result of the abandonment of strict 
sequencing,64 and this Article takes a look at the newest cases. 
III. RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ALL GRANTED QUALIFIED 
IMMUNITY 
The Supreme Court issued decisions in four qualified 
immunity cases in the October 2011 term. Those cases are 
summarized here. 
A. Ryburn v. Huff (Decided Jan. 23, 2012) 
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s denial of 
qualified immunity to two police officers in Ryburn v. Huff,65 
 
 56.  Id. at 530-31. 
 57.  Id. at 531-32. 
 58.  Id. at 528-29. 
 59.  Id. at 525. 
 60.  Hughes, supra note 49, at 412-13; see also Sobolski & Steinberg, supra 
note 48, at 530 (stating that “prior to Saucier sequencing was not mandatory”). 
 61.  Sobolski & Steinberg, supra note 48, at 556. 
 62.  Pearson, 555 U.S. 223; Sobolski & Steinberg, supra note 48, at 556. 
 63.  Sobolski & Steinberg, supra note 48, at 556. 
 64.  Id. at 527. 
 65.  Ryburn, 132 S. Ct. 987. 
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declaring that the officers’ actions were reasonable.66 The case 
involved Sergeant Ryburn, Officer Zepeda and two other Burbank 
police officers who went to the home of Vincent Huff, a high school 
student who had reportedly threatened to “shoot up” the school 
after being bullied.67 Based on their training on school violence, 
the officers intended to interview young Huff, so they knocked 
several times on the front door of his family’s house.68 When no 
one answered, Ryburn called the home telephone, but the call 
went unanswered.69 He next called Mrs. Huff’s cell phone, and 
when she answered, he asked where Vincent was, to which she 
replied that he was in the house with her.70 When told that he and 
other officers wanted to speak with her outside, Mrs. Huff hung 
up.71 Shortly thereafter, the mother and son appeared on the front 
steps but, without asking why they were there, Mrs. Huff refused 
to allow the officers to go inside and interview Vincent.72 When 
Ryburn asked if there were any guns in the house, Mrs. Huff 
immediately turned and ran back into the house.73 Suspicious 
about her behavior and claiming that he was scared because he 
had seen too many officers killed, Ryburn followed her into the 
house.74 Zepeda immediately followed because of “officer safety” 
concerns.75 The officers stood in the living room and when Mr. 
Huff appeared they interviewed him and his son for five or ten 
minutes, but conducted no search.76 Concluding that the rumors of 
threatened violence were unfounded, the officers reported their 
determination to the school.77 
The Huffs sued the police officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for 
violation of their Fourth Amendment rights.78 After a two-day 
bench trial, the district court concluded that the officers were 
entitled to qualified immunity and entered judgment in their 
favor.79 The Ninth Circuit reversed as to Ryburn and Zepeda (the 
two who knew there was no consent to enter), concluding that 
although police officers are allowed to enter a home if they 
reasonably believe that it is necessary to protect themselves or 
 
 66.  Id. at 992. 
 67.  Id. at 988. 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Id. at 988-89. 
 73.  Id. at 989. 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  Id. (noting also that two other officers entered, but they had not heard 
the verbal exchange and assumed that consent to enter was granted). 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id. 
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others from harm, these two acted unreasonably and should not be 
shielded by qualified immunity.80 Dissenting, Judge Rawlinson of 
the Ninth Circuit wrote that the majority had relied on a sanitized 
version of the facts, and that an officer in that situation “could 
have reasonably believed that he was justified in making a 
warrantless entry.”81 
The Supreme Court held: 
[R]easonable officers in petitioners’ position could have come to the 
conclusion that the Fourth Amendment permitted them to enter the 
Huff residence if there was an objectively reasonable basis for 
fearing that violence was imminent. And a reasonable officer could 
have come to such a conclusion based on the facts as found by the 
District Court.82 
Rather than looking at the situation from the viewpoint of the 
Huffs (the aggrieved parties), the Court reviewed the scenario in 
light of the officers’ perceptions.83 Emphasizing that “judges 
should be cautious about second-guessing a police officer’s 
assessment, made on the scene,” the Court sided with the officers 
and granted them qualified immunity.84 
B. Messerschmidt v. Millender (Decided Feb. 22, 2012) 
The Supreme Court of the United States held in 
Messerschmidt v. Millender85 that Detective Messerschmidt and 
his fellow officer Lawrence were entitled to qualified immunity 
when they were sued after searching a house pursuant to a 
warrant. Messerschmidt prepared the search warrant and showed 
to his two supervising officers and the Deputy District Attorney 
before submitting it to a magistrate who approved it.86 The 
Supreme Court indicated that the validity of the warrant itself 
was not at issue, and that the sole question was whether the 
officers were entitled to qualified immunity “even assuming that 
the warrant should not have been issued.”87 
The case involved a search of a home occupied by the 
Millender family.88 A weapon confiscated during the search 
belonged to the grandmother who later sued for violation of her 
 
 80.  Id. at 989-90 (stating that ‘“any belief that the officers or other family 
members were in serious, imminent harm would have been objectively 
unreasonable’ given that [Mrs. Huff] merely asserted her right to end her 
conversation with the officers and returned to her home”). 
 81.  Id. at 990. 
 82.  Id. at 992. 
 83.  Id. at 991-92. 
 84.  Id.  
 85.  Messerschmidt, 132 S. Ct. 1235. 
 86.  Id. at 1243. 
 87.  Id. at 1244. 
 88.  Id. at 1240. 
Do Not Delete 11/17/2012  9:14 PM 
1034 The John Marshall Law Review [45:1023 
Fourth Amendment rights.89 The officers were searching for 
evidence of a crime in which the suspect, Jerry Ray Bowen, shot at 
his girlfriend as she attempted to break up with him.90 The victim 
told police that her boyfriend fired at her with a sawed-off shotgun 
and told her that he would kill her if she tried to leave.91 She also 
told police that Bowen was affiliated with a local street gang, the 
Mona Park Crips.92 The crime, however, did not appear to be 
related to gang activity.93 Bowen fired the gun at Kelly as she was 
attempting to drive away after moving out of an apartment to 
which Bowen had the key.94 
Drafted by Detective Messerschmidt, the search warrant 
authorized two broad searches, one for “[a]ll handguns, rifles, or 
shotguns of any caliber, or any firearms capable of firing 
ammunition,” and the other for “[a]rticles of evidence showing 
street gang membership.”95 The Ninth Circuit held that this 
search warrant was unconstitutionally overbroad in two ways.96 
First, the warrant failed to establish probable cause to search for 
“all firearms” instead of only the black sawed-off shotgun 
reportedly used in the crime.97 Second, the warrant was defective 
because it failed to establish any link between the domestic 
violence incident and the request to search for gang-related 
materials.98 The Ninth Circuit denied qualified immunity on the 
grounds that “a reasonable officer in the deputies’ position would 
have been well aware of this [constitutional] deficiency,” and 
therefore, the test for immunity could not be met.99 
In holding that Messerschmidt and Lawrence should be 
shielded from suit,100 the Supreme Court overruled the Ninth 
Circuit’s en banc denial101 of qualified immunity.102 The Supreme 
Court focused on the second prong of the test for qualified 
immunity, skipping the first aspect entirely.103 The Court stated 
that “[t]he doctrine of qualified immunity protects government 
officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct 
does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional 
 
 89.  Id. at 1258 n.10. 
 90.  Id. at 1241. 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  Id. at 1242. 
 96.  Id. at 1244. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  Id. at 1241. 
 101.  Millender, 620 F.3d at 1034-35. 
 102.  Messerschmidt, 132 S. Ct. at 1250-51. 
 103.  Id. at 1244. 
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rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’”104 The 
Court did, however, acknowledge that the shield of immunity 
could be lost if a warrant was “‘based on an affidavit so lacking in 
indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence 
entirely unreasonable.’”105 The Court determined that the warrant 
in question was not so plainly defective and the officers’ belief in 
its validity was reasonable.106 
With regard to the search for “all firearms,” the Supreme 
Court came up with possible scenarios in which a search for 
weapons other than the sawed-off shotgun that Bowen used might 
have been permissible.107 The majority concluded that “it would 
not have been entirely unreasonable” for Messerschmidt and 
Lawrence to have believed they had probable cause to search for 
all the evidence they sought.108 For example, the officers could 
have believed that Bowen owned additional firearms, and it was 
reasonable for them to assume that some of those guns might be 
illegal and that “seizure of the firearms was necessary to prevent 
further assaults on Kelly.”109 
As to the search for gang-related evidence, the Court found a 
way to characterize the attack as one that was possibly linked to 
Bowen’s gang membership.110 Indicating that the attack was not 
simply a domestic dispute, but that it was described in the 
affidavit as “spousal assault and an assault with a deadly 
weapon,”111 the majority concluded that “[a] reasonable officer 
could certainly view Bowen’s attack as motivated not by the 
souring of his romantic relationship with Kelly but instead by a 
desire to prevent her from disclosing details of his gang activity to 
the police.”112 Viewing the scenario in that light, a search for gang-
related material was deemed relevant.113 The Supreme Court then 
sidestepped whether these interpretations of the facts would have 
amounted to probable cause, and merely concluded that “[t]he 
officers’ judgment that the scope of the warrant was supported by 
probable cause may have been mistaken, but it was not ‘plainly 
incompetent.’”114 
The Supreme Court further stated that “[w]here the alleged 
 
 104.  Id. (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231, which quoted Harlow, 457 U.S. at 
818, the case in which the good faith requirement was purged from the 
qualified immunity test). 
 105.  Id. at 1245 (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984)). 
 106.  Id. at 1246. 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Id. at 1246-47. 
 109.  Id. at 1246. 
 110.  Id. at 1247. 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Id. at 1249 (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). 
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Fourth Amendment violation involves a search or seizure 
pursuant to a warrant, the fact that a neutral magistrate has 
issued a warrant is the clearest indication that the officers acted 
in an objectively reasonable manner.”115 Moreover, the majority 
wrote that the appropriate inquiry is not whether the magistrate 
erred, but “whether the magistrate so obviously erred that any 
reasonable officer would have recognized the error.”116 Only on 
rare occasions would such an obvious error be made, stated Chief 
Justice John Roberts, and he indicated that, likewise, only in rare 
circumstances should “personal liability [be imposed] on a lay 
officer in the face of judicial approval of his actions.”117 
The dissent took issue with the majority view, writing that 
“[t]he Court’s analysis bears little relationship to the record in this 
case, our precedents, or the purposes underlying qualified 
immunity analysis.”118 Justice Sotomayor continued in her dissent 
that the correct inquiry is “not whether different conclusions 
might conceivably be drawn from the crime scene,” but instead, it 
is “whether a ‘reasonably well-trained officer in petitioner’s 
position would have known that his affidavit failed to establish 
probable cause.’”119 Concluding that a reasonable officer could not 
have believed that he had probable cause to search for gang-
related evidence, Justice Sotomayor characterized the search by 
Messerschmidt as the “kind of fishing expedition for evidence of 
unidentified criminal activity committed by unspecified persons 
[that] was the very evil the Fourth Amendment was intended to 
prevent.”120 
The dissent also criticized the majority’s erosion of Malley v. 
Briggs’s holding that an officer “cannot excuse his own default by 
pointing to the greater incompetence of the magistrate.”121 Justice 
Sotomayor described the effect of the majority’s decision as one 
“hold[ing] blameless the ‘plainly incompetent’ action of the police 
officer seeking a warrant because of the ‘plainly incompetent’ 
approval of his superiors and the district attorney.”122 
One of her stated concerns was that the majority’s holding 
will encourage “sloppy police work” and “exacerbate[e] the risk” of 
Fourth Amendment violations.123 Just as eloquently as Chief 
Justice Roberts described the purposes underlying the qualified 
 
 115.  Id. at 1245 (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 922-23). 
 116.  Id. at 1250. 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Id. at 1253 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 119.  Id. at 1256 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 120.  Id. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 121.  Id. at 1260 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting Malley, 475 U.S. at 346 
n.9). 
 122.  Id. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 123.  Id. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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immunity doctrine in Filarsky v. Delia124 by pointing to history 
and tradition,125 Justice Sotomayor heralded the purpose of the 
Fourth Amendment stating that “efforts ‘to bring the guilty to 
punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the 
sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor 
and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the 
fundamental law of the land.’”126 
C. Filarsky v. Delia (Decided Apr. 17, 2012) 
The issue in Filarsky127 was whether qualified immunity 
would extend to a private attorney who was hired by the city to 
conduct an internal affairs investigation of possible wrongdoing by 
a city firefighter.128 The question as framed by the Supreme Court 
was “whether an individual hired by the government to do its work 
is prohibited from seeking such immunity, solely because he works 
for the government on something other than a permanent or full-
time basis.”129 
The Ninth Circuit concluded that Filarsky was not entitled to 
qualified immunity “because he was a private attorney and not a 
City employee,”130 but the Supreme Court held otherwise. Stating 
that the common law “did not draw a distinction between public 
servants and private individuals engaged in public service in 
according protection to those carrying out government 
responsibilities,”131 the Court traced the history and the purposes 
of qualified immunity and concluded that Filarsky was entitled to 
protection.132 
The Court emphasized that its holding was consistent with 
the important reasons that justify the doctrine of qualified 
immunity. The reasons are: (1) the shield of qualified immunity 
helps to “avoid ‘unwarranted timidity’ in performance of public 
duties” and ensures that “those who serve the government do so 
‘with the decisiveness and the judgment required by the public 
good,’”133 (2) qualified immunity ensures that “talented candidates 
are not deterred from public service,”134 and (3) the grant of 
 
 124.  Filarsky, 132 S. Ct. 1657. 
 125.  Id. at 1667-68. 
 126.  Messerschmidt, 132 S. Ct. at 1261 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914)). 
 127.  Filarsky, 132 S. Ct. 1657. 
 128.  Id. at 1660. 
 129.  Id. 
 130.  Id. at 1661. 
 131.  Id. at 1663. 
 132.  Id. at 1667-68. 
 133.  Id. at 1665 (quoting Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 167 (1992)). 
 134.  Id. at 1665. The Court added: 
To the extent such private individuals do not depend on the government 
for their livelihood, they have freedom to select other work—work that 
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qualified immunity “prevent[s] the harmful distractions from 
carrying out the work of government that can often accompany 
damages suits.”135 
The majority did not address whether the test for qualified 
immunity would be met in this factual scenario, and Justice 
Ginsburg in her concurrence suggested that there should still be 
an inquiry into whether Filarsky “knew or should have known 
that his conduct violated a right ‘clearly established’ at the 
time.”136 The important point in this case is that the Supreme 
Court extended the reach of the protective shield so that even a 
private employee can be covered in certain instances. 
D. Reichle v. Howards (Decided June 4, 2012) 
In Reichle v. Howards,137 the Supreme Court reversed the 
Tenth Circuit’s denial of qualified immunity to Secret Service 
agents Gus Reichle and Dan Doyle, who were part of a protective 
detail guarding then-Vice President Dick Cheney during a public 
appearance at a shopping mall in Colorado.138 The agents were 
sued for allegedly violating the Fourth and First Amendment 
rights of a man who aroused suspicion, touched Vice President 
Cheney on the shoulder, and then lied about it.139 That man, 
Steven Howards, was overheard by Agent Doyle saying, “I’m going 
to ask [the Vice President] how many kids he’s killed today.”140 
Howards then got in line to greet the Vice President.141 In a brief 
encounter, Howards told Cheney that his “policies in Iraq are 
disgusting,” and when the Vice President simply thanked Howards 
and moved on, Howards touched Cheney on the shoulder and 
walked away.142 Secret Service Agent Reichle approached 
Howards, who refused to speak with him.143 Howards tried to 
 
will not expose them to liability for government actions. This makes it 
more likely that the most talented candidates will decline public 
engagements if they do not receive the same immunity enjoyed by their 
public employee counterparts. 
Id. at 1666. 
 135.  Id. at 1665. The court added “[n]ot only will such individuals’ 
performance of any ongoing government responsibilities suffer from the 
distraction of lawsuits, but such distractions will also often affect any public 
employees with whom they work by embroiling those employees in litigation.” 
Id. at 1666. 
 136.  Id. at 1668 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 137.  Reichle, 132 S. Ct. 2088. 
 138.  Id. at 2091. 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  Id. 
 141.  Id. 
 142.  Id. 
 142.  Id. at 2091-92. 
 143.  Id. at 2091. 
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leave, but Agent Reichle stepped in front of him.144 When Reichle 
asked Howards if he touched Vice President Cheney, he said 
“no.”145 After confirming that several agents saw the touch—some 
describing it as a shove146—Agent Reichle arrested Howards.147 
Howard was transferred to local law enforcement officials who 
charged him with violating the state law on harassment.148 
Howards sued the agents under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging 
that he was arrested and searched without probable cause in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment, and that his arrest was in 
retaliation for his criticism of the Vice President and thus violated 
his First Amendment rights.149 The district court denied summary 
judgment to the agents who claimed they were entitled to qualified 
immunity, and on interlocutory appeal, a divided Tenth Circuit 
panel decided that the agents were entitled to qualified immunity 
as to the Fourth Amendment claim, but not as to the First 
Amendment claim.150 
The Supreme Court considered whether the officers were also 
entitled to qualified immunity as to the First Amendment claim. 
The Court stated that the right in question was the “right to be 
free from a retaliatory arrest that is otherwise supported by 
probable cause.”151 In other words, if the arrest is supported by 
probable cause, does a retaliatory motive render the arrest 
unconstitutional? The majority emphasized that the Court has 
never held that there is a right to be free from a retaliatory arrest 
when probable cause justifies the arrest.152 The Court declined to 
address it in this case,153 stating that “[t]his approach comports 
with our usual reluctance to decide constitutional questions 
unnecessarily”.154 
Skipping the first prong of the test for qualified immunity,155 
 
 144.  Id. 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  Id. at 2091 n.1. 
 147.  Id. at 2092. 
 148.  Id. (noting that the charge was eventually dismissed). 
 149.  Id. 
 150.  Id. 
 151.  Id. at 2093. 
 152.  Id. at 2094. 
 153.  Id. at 2093 (stating “[w]e elect to address only the second question”, 
thus not addressing “whether a First Amendment retaliatory arrest claim may 
lie despite the presence of probable cause to support the arrest”); see also id. at 
2093 n.4 (stating that “[w]e need not (and do not) decide here whether Bivens 
extends to First Amendment retaliatory claims.”). 
 154.  Id. at 2093.  
 155.  Id. at 2094. The Supreme Court in Pearson held that courts are 
permitted to address the two prongs of the Saucier test in either order. 
Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. It appears from the 2012 decisions that the Supreme 
Court is largely dispensing with the old first prong entirely (whether the 
conduct violated a constitutional right) and is using a simplified version of 
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the Supreme Court addressed whether the purported right was 
“clearly established.”156 Concluding that the law was far from 
clear,157 the Supreme Court held that Agents Reichle and Doyle 
were entitled to qualified immunity.158 
Concurring, Justice Ginsburg emphasized the importance of 
deferring to the on-the-scene judgment of officers. She wrote, 
“[o]fficers assigned to protect public officials must make singularly 
swift, on the spot, decisions whether the safety of the person they 
are guarding is in jeopardy . . . [i]f rational, that assessment 
should not expose them to claims for civil damages.”159 
IV. TROUBLESOME ASPECTS OF THE CURRENT APPROACH 
A few aspects of the Supreme Court’s recent qualified 
immunity decisions are troublesome. These problematic aspects 
include (1) the failure to clarify important constitutional rights 
that may be infringed upon, and (2) the grant of qualified 
immunity in such extreme situations that the distinction between 
absolute and qualified immunity is almost eliminated for all 
practical purposes. Moreover, the circularity of qualified immunity 
reasoning leaves state officials uncertain about their actions and 
stagnates the development of the law. These concerns are not 
necessarily new, but this section of the Article takes a look at 
these issues in light of the four recent Supreme Court opinions. 
A. Failure to Articulate Constitutional Rights 
The current post-Pearson period where courts are free to 
address the two prongs in either order is an excellent time to 
analyze how often courts choose to avoid the underlying 
constitutional questions.160 The prediction is that there will be less 
 
test, taken from Pearson. Reichle, 132 S. Ct. at 2093 (stating that “courts may 
grant qualified immunity on the ground that a purported right was not ‘clearly 
established’ by prior case law, without resolving the often more difficult 
question whether the purported right exists at all”). 
 156.  See id. at 2094 (referencing Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250 (2006), 
and the Tenth Circuit opinions in DeLoach v. Bevers, 922 F.2d 618 (10th Cir. 
1990) and Poole v. Cnty. of Otero, 271 F.3d 955 (10th Cir. 2001)). 
 157.  Id. at 2095. 
 158.  Id. at 2097 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (stating that “at the time of 
Howard’s arrest, it was not clearly established that an arrest supported by 
probable cause could violate the First Amendment”). 
 159.  Id.  
 160.  Sobolski & Steinberg, supra note 48, at 527. An observation in the 
Sobolski-Steinberg empirical study has been borne out by recent opinions. 
They state: “The stakes are high because the difference between mandatory or 
discretionary sequencing may bear on the frequency with which courts 
address substantive constitutional rights questions, which in turn impacts the 
‘rate’ at which constitutional rights are ‘clearly established’ through 
precedents.” Id. at 525. 
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articulation and less clarification of constitutional rights during 
this non-mandatory sequencing period. Anecdotally, that appears 
to be true. 
The 2012 decisions reveal that the Supreme Court is largely 
dispensing with the old first prong entirely (that is, whether the 
conduct violated a constitutional right). Although the Supreme 
Court held in Pearson that the prongs could be addressed in either 
order,161 the reality is that the first prong is not currently being 
addressed at all in most cases. For example, the Supreme Court in 
Messerschmidt did not reference the traditional two-pronged test, 
instead focused on the “clearly established” prong of qualified 
immunity analysis.162 Similarly, the Supreme Court skipped the 
threshold question in Reichle, which was whether an arrest 
justified by probable cause may nonetheless violate the First 
Amendment if the arrest was made in retaliation for political 
speech.163 The Court acknowledged that certiorari was granted on 
two issues, but deliberately avoided the threshold constitutional 
one, stating, “[w]e elect to address only the second question” 
(whether the law was clearly established).164 
Again in Ryburn, the Supreme Court did not apply the two-
pronged test for qualified immunity.165 Instead of focusing on 
whether the Huffs asserted a clearly established Fourth 
Amendment right that was violated, the Court viewed the 
situation from the vantage point of the police and simply quoted 
an earlier opinion saying “it would be silly to suggest that the 
police would commit a tort by entering [a residence] . . . to 
determine whether violence . . . is about to (or soon will) occur.”166 
The Court analyzed whether it was objectively reasonable for the 
police to have acted as they did, and the result seemed to be 
predisposed in their favor.167 The Court moved swiftly to the 
determination that the officers deserved the protection of the 
qualified immunity doctrine.168 
The Court’s current position is consistent with the 
jurisprudential admonition that if a case can be decided on other 
than constitutional grounds, the Court should not delve into the 
constitutional issue.169 The Supreme Court stated in Pearson that 
“[a]dherence to Saucier’s two-step protocol departs from the 
 
 161.  Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. 
 162.  Messerschmidt, 132 S. Ct. at 1244. 
 163.  Reichle, 132 S. Ct. at 2093. 
 164.  Id. 
 165.  See Ryburn, 132 S. Ct. at 990 (failing to address both prongs of the 
qualified immunity test). 
 166.  Id. (quoting Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 118 (2006)). 
 167.  Ryburn, 132 S. Ct. at 991-92. 
 168.  Id. 
 169.  Pearson, 555 U.S. at 241 (quoting Scott, 550 U.S. at 388 (Breyer, J., 
concurring)). 
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general rule of constitutional avoidance.”170 In 2012, the Court 
expressly reiterated this view, saying “courts may grant qualified 
immunity on the ground that a purported right was not ‘clearly 
established’ by prior case law, without resolving the often more 
difficult question whether the purported right exists at all.”171 
The very act of skipping the first step, which is the inquiry 
into whether someone’s constitutional right was violated in the 
first place, signals a shift in emphasis away from the focus on 
individual rights and toward the protection of government officials 
who violate those rights. This approach focuses on the official’s 
action rather than the aggrieved person’s rights. 
The shift in emphasis is apparent in Messerschmidt where the 
Supreme Court itself implied that the search warrant probably 
should not have been issued because it was unconstitutionally 
overbroad, but where the Court constructed scenarios to justify the 
officers’ reliance on that warrant.172 This shift in emphasis may 
indicate which values are paramount in the eyes of the Court. It is 
not the protection of aggrieved citizens that leads the Court to its 
current decisions; it is deference to state officials that weighs more 
heavily. 
B. Determining Whether a Right Was “Clearly Established” 
The Supreme Court in Saucier described the second prong 
this way: if “the conduct did not violate a clearly established right, 
or if it was objectively reasonable for the official to believe that his 
conduct did not violate such a right, then the official is protected 
by qualified immunity.”173 In defining what “clearly established” 
means, the Court said that the inquiry “must be undertaken in 
light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general 
proposition.”174 
1. Reference to Well-Settled Law 
If binding authority sets forth a rule in a factually analogous 
case, one might argue that the law is clearly established. However, 
the existence of a rule that may seem clear to a legal scholar does 
not mean that the “clearly established” prong of the qualified 
immunity test is met.175 The legal guidelines must be viewed in 
 
 170.  Id. (quoting Scott, 550 U.S. at 388 (Breyer, J., concurring)). 
 171.  Reichle, 132 S. Ct. at 2093 (emphasis added). 
 172.  Messerschmidt, 132 S. Ct. at 1246-47. 
 173.  Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205.  
 174.  Id. at 201. 
 175.  See Reichle, 132 S. Ct. at 2093 (stating that “[t]o be clearly established, 
a right must be sufficiently clear ‘that every reasonable official would [have 
understood] that what he is doing violates that right [and] . . . ‘existing 
precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond 
debate’”). 
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the context of the actual situation faced by the state official at the 
time. Mere reference to well-settled case law is not sufficient to 
show that a right is clearly established.176 Nonetheless, case law is 
critically important in the analysis; it simply is not dispositive. “It 
is sometimes difficult for an officer to determine how the relevant 
legal doctrine . . . will apply to the factual situation the officer 
confronts.”177 “The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining 
whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear 
to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the 
situation he confronted.”178 In other words, “[t]he contours of the 
right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would 
understand that what he is doing violates that right.”179 
Even if the state official is mistaken, he or she is still 
“entitled to the immunity defense” so long as “the officer’s mistake 
as to what the law requires is reasonable.”180 The correct inquiry is 
“what the officer reasonably understood his powers and 
responsibilities to be, when he acted, under clearly established 
standards.”181 
In 2001, Justice Ginsburg noted in her Saucier concurrence: 
As aptly observed by the Second Circuit, ‘even learned and 
experienced jurists have had difficulty in defining the rules that 
govern a determination of probable cause . . . . As he tries to find his 
way in this thicket, the police officer must not be held to act at his 
peril.182 
She added, “[l]aw in the area [of probable cause] is constantly 
evolving and, correspondingly, variously interpreted.”183 Thus, 
reference to case law—without a specific factual context—is 
insufficient to resolve whether a right was clearly established at 
the time of the official’s actions. 
 
 
 
 176.  Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201-02. 
 177.  Id. at 205. 
 178.  Id. at 202. The court stated, however, that if  
various courts have agreed that certain conduct is a constitutional 
violation under facts not distinguishable in a fair way from the facts 
presented in the case at hand, the officer would not be entitled to 
qualified immunity based simply on the argument that courts had not 
agreed on one verbal formulation of the controlling standard. 
Id. at 202-03. 
 179.  Id. at 202 (citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). 
 180.  Id. at 205. 
 181.  Id. at 208; see also Reichle, 132 S. Ct. at 2093 (reversing the Court of 
Appeals grant of qualified immunity). 
 182.  Saucier, 533 U.S. at 214-15 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 183.  Id. at 214 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
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2. Were the Officer’s Actions Objectively Reasonable? 
The second aspect of “clearly established” focuses on whether 
the state official’s actions were objectively reasonable.184 Where 
reasonable officials could differ, even if they are mistaken, it 
cannot be said that the legal right was “clearly established.”185 The 
test is objective. 
Prior to 1982,186 the shield of qualified immunity from suit 
was only available to those government officials who acted in good 
faith.187 The “good faith” requirement was purged from the test for 
qualified immunity roughly thirty years ago188 when the Supreme 
Court announced that an objective test, rather than a subjective 
standard, would be used in determining whether officials in a 
given situation were entitled to qualified immunity.189 The test 
changed significantly from a subjective inquiry into the mindset of 
the government official to the current objective test, that is, 
whether the official’s actions were objectively reasonable.190 In 
Harlow, the Supreme Court abandoned the good faith 
requirement.191 
Since Harlow, the objective test has become more and more 
 
 184.  Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231. 
 185.  See id. at 231 (stating that “[t]he protection of qualified immunity 
applies regardless of whether the government official’s error is ‘a mistake of 
law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions of law and fact”). 
 186.  Harlow, 457 U.S. at 816. 
 187.  Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 484 (1978) (stating “officials of the 
Executive Branch exercising discretionary functions did not need the 
protection of an absolute immunity from suit, but only a qualified immunity 
based on good faith and reasonable grounds”) (emphasis added); Imbler v. 
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 434 (1976) (stating that officials who fall within the 
protection of the qualified immunity doctrine “may be held liable for 
unconstitutional conduct absent ‘good faith’”) (emphasis added). 
 188.  Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. 
 189.  Id. 
 190.  Id. As the Second Circuit stated in Doninger, in a decision that the 
Supreme Court let stand, it is irrelevant whether the school official’s actions 
toward the student were “improperly motivated” because the qualified 
immunity test is objective, not subjective, and the mindset of the individual 
officer is irrelevant unless “intent is an element” of the claim or defense. 
Doninger v. Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334, 349 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 
449 (2011) (emphasis added). 
 191.  Harlow, 457 U.S. at 816-17; see also Comment, Harlow v. Fitzgerald: 
The Lower Courts Implement the New Standard for Qualified Immunity Under 
Section 1983, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 901, 904 (1984) (stating that “Harlow . . . 
[held] that the good faith of an official seeking qualified immunity was to be 
measured against an ‘objective’ standard”). Although the concurring opinion 
adopted by Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun in Harlow stated that “[t]his 
standard would not allow the official who actually knows that he was violating 
the law to escape liability for his actions, even if he could not ‘reasonably have 
been expected’ to know what he actually did know,” the majority attempted to 
eliminate or minimize the inquiry into the mindset of the actor. Harlow, 457 
U.S. at 816-17; Comment, supra, at 929 n.151. 
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“objective,” now covering not only those state officials whose 
actions were “reasonable,” but those whose actions were not 
“entirely unreasonable.”192 For example, the Court stated in 
Messerschmidt that “it would not have been ‘entirely unreasonable’ 
for an officer to believe that the facts set out in the affidavit 
established a fair probability that such evidence would aid the 
prosecution of Bowen for the criminal acts at issue.”193 Further, 
the majority wrote that “it would not have been ‘entirely 
unreasonable’ for an officer to believe . . . that there was probable 
cause.”194 The wording itself shows a tendency to view the state 
officials’ conduct leniently, shifting the measuring point from what 
is “reasonable” to what is “not entirely unreasonable.”195 
Currently, the objective government official merely has to act 
in a way that is not “entirely unreasonable.”196 He or she must 
simply avoid blatantly and incontrovertibly violating the law. The 
Supreme Court appears willing to speculate as to possible 
acceptable, i.e., reasonable, scenarios so as to justify the actions of 
a police officer, as was pointed out by the dissent in 
Messerschmidt.197 The Court has interpreted the “all but the 
plainly incompetent” rule very broadly and generously, e.g., in 
Messerschmidt where the police officers should have known from 
experience that the search warrant was overbroad even though it 
was issued by a neutral magistrate.198 The Ninth Circuit denied 
qualified immunity to the police officers, saying that a reasonable 
police officer would have known the warrant was invalid.199 The 
Supreme Court, as stated, granted them qualified immunity on 
the rationale that even if they were mistaken, their mistake was 
reasonable.200 The majority emphasized that the search warrant 
“was not so obviously lacking in probable cause that the officers 
can be considered ‘plainly incompetent’ for concluding 
otherwise.”201 The majority’s characterization of the 
Messerschmidt facts seems speculative, even in the eyes of some 
members of the Court.202 The Court’s opinion is, however, an 
 
 192.  Messerschmidt, 132 S. Ct. at 1249. 
 193.  Id. 
 194.  Id. at 1239 (emphasis added). 
 195.  Id. at 1249. 
 196.  Id. 
 197.  Id. at 1254 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (stating that “the Court reaches 
this result only by way of an unprecedented, post hoc reconstruction of the 
crime that wholly ignores the police’s own conclusions, as well as the 
undisputed facts presented to the District Court”). 
 198.  Id. at 1260 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 199.  Millender, 620 F.3d at 1035. 
 200.  Messerschmidt, 132 S. Ct. at 1250-51. 
 201.  Id. at 1250. 
 202.  See supra text accompanying notes 118-126. Slightly less forcefully, 
Justice Kagan, concurring in part and dissenting in part, described the 
majority’s analysis as an “inadequate justification.” Messerschmidt, 132 S. Ct. 
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informative peek into the current mindset of the majority 
regarding qualified immunity. 
Qualified immunity does not shield “the plainly incompetent,” 
nor does qualified immunity protect “those who knowingly violate 
the law.”203 In actuality, this second aspect gets little attention in 
current qualified immunity analysis. Since the 1982 shift to the 
objective test, inquiries into whether an officer acted in good faith 
or out of malice are not fully explored.204 In Harlow, the Court 
stated that “[w]here an official could be expected to know that 
certain conduct would violate statutory or constitutional rights, he 
should be made to hesitate.”205 Nonetheless, the dangling phrase 
“or those who knowingly violate the law” seems to linger like a 
vestige of the past. Like the human appendix, this once vital 
aspect of the qualified immunity test no longer provides a useful 
function. 
The elimination of the good faith element made the qualified 
immunity doctrine more similar than ever before to absolute 
immunity. There may be a blurring of the line between absolute 
immunity and qualified immunity. Given the Court’s current 
position that the certainty of being shielded by the qualified 
immunity doctrine is of paramount importance, the grant of 
qualified immunity is so likely that it is almost tantamount to 
absolute immunity. With regard to absolute immunity, the 
Supreme Court stated in 1976 that that it is “in the end better to 
leave unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers than to 
subject those who try to do their duty to the constant dread of 
retaliation.”206 While the Supreme Court made that statement 
almost forty years ago with regard to absolute immunity, it 
appears that its reasoning reflects the 2012 view as to qualified 
immunity. 
In short, the objective standard, as applied, has shifted from 
what is “reasonable” to what is “not unreasonable” to what is “not 
entirely unreasonable.” It appears that all but the plainly 
incompetent are shielded from personal liability, and there is 
generous leeway for mistakes before an officer would be deemed 
incompetent. The Court will withhold the shield of qualified 
immunity only if the actions of the officers were so extreme that no 
competent officer could possibly have done such a thing. This shift 
is particularly evident in the 2012 decisions. 
 
at 1252 (Kagan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 203.  Messerschmidt, 132 S. Ct. at 1244-45. 
 204.  See supra text accompanying note 190 (providing an example of a 
court’s refusal in 2011 to inquire as to an official’s motive or malice). 
 205.  Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819. 
 206.  Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 428 (1976) (referring to absolute, 
not qualified, immunity). 
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3. Circular Reasoning: Unresolved Legal Questions Remain 
Unclear 
The avoidance of the constitutional question in qualified 
immunity cases leaves an allegedly unclear area of law entirely 
unsettled, and the state officials remain uncertain whether their 
actions will violate someone else’s constitutional rights. If they are 
uncertain, and the law is unclear, then these officials will continue 
to be protected by qualified immunity. The resulting circularity is 
one of the most striking problems that surfaces in recent Supreme 
Court opinions on qualified immunity. 
In Reichle, for example, the underlying constitutional 
question was whether an arrest in retaliation for the exercise of 
First Amendment rights is unlawful when the arrest is justified by 
probable cause.207 The Supreme Court announced that it “has 
never recognized” such a right,208 but did not decide whether the 
right exists. Instead, the Supreme Court disagreed with the Court 
of Appeals’s application of precedent such as DeLoach,209 which 
involved both a retaliatory arrest and a retaliatory prosecution.210 
The Court also addressed whether its own decision in Hartman211 
that “a plaintiff cannot state a claim of retaliatory prosecution in 
violation of the First Amendment if the charges were supported by 
probable cause”212 had been correctly interpreted by some courts to 
pertain also to retaliatory arrests.213 Saying “we do not suggest 
that Hartman’s rule in fact extends to arrests,”214 the Supreme 
Court declined to state definitively whether the rule does or does 
not apply. Instead, the Court simply opined that “when Howards 
was arrested it was not clearly established that an arrest 
supported by probable cause could give rise to a First Amendment 
violation.”215 Because of the lack of a holding on the underlying 
constitutional issue, the answer remains unclear, and the next 
police officer in a similar situation will not have guidance as to 
whether a retaliatory arrest that is supported by probable cause 
will violate the offender’s First Amendment rights. Since the law 
is not clearly established, the officer who potentially violates 
someone’s rights will be shielded from suit by the doctrine of 
qualified immunity. 
Not only is circular reasoning illustrated in Reichle, it can 
also be seen in other cases in which the Supreme Court denied 
 
 207.  Reichle, 132 S. Ct. at 2094. 
 208.  Id. at 2093. 
 209.  DeLoach, 922 F.2d 618. 
 210.  Id. at 620. 
 211.  Hartman, 547 U.S. 250. 
 212.  Reichle, 132 S. Ct. at 2094. 
 213.  Id. 
 214.  Id. at 2096. 
 215.  Id. at 2097. 
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certiorari in the October 2011 Term, for example, in lawsuits over 
whether public schools’ regulation of students’ internet speech 
violates the students’ first amendment rights.216 If a school 
principal punishes a student for an off-campus Facebook posting 
that targets another student, the law is unsettled as to whether 
the landmark school speech test from Tinker217 applies. It is not 
clearly established whether the student has a protected First 
Amendment right that will be violated if the principal takes 
disciplinary action. If the Supreme Court does not clarify the 
boundaries of a school’s authority to regulate internet speech, then 
that area of law will remain as murky and confusing as it 
currently is.218 As long as it remains unresolved as to whether 
Tinker applies to such speech, then the second aspect (whether the 
constitutional right was clearly established at the time) will be 
answered in the negative. When the right is not clearly 
established, the school official is entitled to qualified immunity 
from suit. Thus, the next time a similar situation arises, the school 
official will still be unsure of the legal parameters. 
The impact of allowing courts to skip over the threshold 
question of whether a constitutional right exists at all has yet to 
be fully determined, but if the October 2011 Term’s decisions are 
any hint, there will be fewer opinions delving into the underlying 
rights and more decisions finding that the law was not clearly 
defined. In other words, that circularity will continue: more courts 
will avoid clarifying the law and will in turn grant qualified 
immunity to officials whose actions were taken when the law was 
unclear. 
V. CONCLUSION 
As Chief Justice Roberts stated, the Supreme Court’s position 
is that state officials should be able to rely on the shield of 
qualified immunity.219 Certainty—the certainty of being immune 
from liability—is important to those who do the work of the 
government. Underlying the Supreme Court’s most recent 
decisions is a ringing affirmation of the value of public service and 
the important nature of government work. The Court’s focus is on 
the importance of the governmental system, the vital role of state 
officials in maintaining order and promoting the public welfare, 
 
 216.  Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Schs., 132 S. Ct. 1095 (2012) (mem.), 
denying cert. to 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011); Blue Mtn. Sch. Dist. v. J.S. ex rel. 
Snyder, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012) (mem.), denying cert. to 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 
2011) (consolidated pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 12.4 with Hermitage 
Sch. Dist. v. Layshock); Doninger, 132 S. Ct. 499 (mem.), denying cert. to 642 
F.3d 334 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 217.  Tinker, 393 U.S. 503. 
 218.  See, e.g., Doninger, 642 F.3d 334; Kowalski, 652 F.3d 565. 
 219.  Filarsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1666. 
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the immunity doctrine’s longstanding historical roots,220 and the 
deference and respect due to those who perform government 
functions.221 
For those who are concerned about individual rights, these 
times are tough. Thirty years ago, the Supreme Court stated that 
“the resolution of immunity questions inherently requires a 
balance between the evils inevitable in any available alternative . . 
. [and] an action for damages may offer the only realistic avenue 
for vindication of constitutional guarantees.”222 That avenue has 
narrowed. The direction the Supreme Court is now taking is clear, 
and it favors those who do the work of the government, not the 
average citizen. 
That said, it is appropriate to shield government workers 
from individual liability if they perform their jobs reasonably and 
competently. The risk, however, is that the test is applied so 
broadly that it may also protect those state officials who 
unreasonably and incompetently violate the individual rights of a 
citizen. 
Perhaps there will be a return to Saucier-style sequencing in 
the next decade, in keeping with the period shifts of the past forty 
years of qualified immunity decision-making. Until that time, the 
current approach is likely to result in legal stagnation as to 
complex and unsettled constitutional questions. It is also likely 
that qualified immunity will be granted to government workers in 
a substantial majority of the cases brought by aggrieved persons. 
The decisions have drifted away from the protection of victims that 
the Supreme Court spoke of in Harlow: “The public interest in 
deterrence of unlawful conduct and in compensation of victims 
remains protected by a test that focuses on the objective legal 
reasonableness of an official’s acts.”223 
For state officials, the Supreme Court’s emphasis on 
“certainty” is a wonderful benefit, but for citizens whose rights are 
abridged by the government, the prospect of recovering money 
damages from the officials is very slim. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 220.  Id. at 1664. 
 221.  Id. at 1666. 
 222.  Harlow, 457 U.S. at 813-14. 
 223.  Id. at 819 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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